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GATEKEEPING THE GATEKEEPERS: THE 
NEED FOR A LICENSING REQUIREMENT 
FOR CROWDFUNDING PORTALS IN THE 
WAKE OF THE DREAMFUNDED DECISION
Nick Worden*
ABSTRACT
Most people are familiar with crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and 
GoFundMe—sites that allow users to part with their money in exchange for 
products or donate their capital to organizations they believe in.  However, 
these sites have one trait in common: they do not offer contributors equity or a 
promise for future profits.  For a long time, selling equity meant complying 
with the costly requirements of federal securities laws, which was cost-
prohibitive for many small businesses; it was illegal for businesses to offer 
equity over a site in the way businesses on Kickstarter offered products.  The 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act changed that.  Small businesses, 
initially precluded from raising capital through the promise of equity, could do 
so now.  However, the passage of the JOBS Act came with a number of 
requirements for businesses trying to sell equity via crowdfunding.  
In particular, these businesses could not offer their equity through just any 
Internet site.  They had to do so through a registered intermediary—a
gatekeeper to the equity crowdfunding scene.  These intermediaries came in 
two types: broker-dealers (a familiar party in securities law) and a new 
statutorily created entity called a “funding portal.” Funding portals have 
many requirements imposed on them, but unlike broker-dealers, they are not 
required to be licensed to act as an intermediary.
The absence of a licensing requirement for funding portals is problematic.  
The first litigated case involving a funding portal, Department of Enforcement 
v. DreamFunded Marketplace, LLC, presented that the lack of a licensing 
requirement threatens the twin purposes of the JOBS Act: capital formation 
and investor protection.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of Michigan Law School. I am deeply grateful to 
the staff of the Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review for their help through the publi-
cation process. Thank you also to Laura Billiter, without whom I wouldn’t have written this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
“Tell me about DreamFunded,” a television reporter for San Francisco’s lo-
cal CBS station asked Manuel Fernandez, CEO and co-founder of DreamFund-
ed.1 “It allows entrepreneurs to be able to raise money from everyone, not just 
the rich anymore.  And so that also allows people to have equity in their com-
pany, so therefore if it grows, people can do well,” Mr. Fernandez responded.
The reporter clarified: “So it’s like a crowdfunding platform?”2 “Crowdfunding 
1. KPIX CBS SF Bay Area, Manny Fernandez on DreamFunded, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J8Qr_SF0fQ (interview with Manuel Fernandez); 
DreamFunded, Manny Fernandez, Co-Founder/CEO, https://www.dreamfunded.com/manny-
fernandez (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
2. Id.
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for equity, yes,” Fernandez replied, “[Investors] are getting a return on their in-
vestment . . . instead of just getting a T-shirt.”3
This exchange marks a shift in “crowdfunding.” Crowdfunding is a way for 
startups, small businesses, and charities to raise capital over the internet from 
the public by soliciting small sums of contributions from many contributors.4
These small contributions add up.  The sheer quantity of transactions often pro-
duces enough funding for the capital raisers to finance their goals.
There are different variants of crowdfunding, which correspond to the goals 
of these entities.  Rewards-based crowdfunding, for example, promises contrib-
utors a token of a crowdfunding company’s appreciation—such as a future 
product or a T-shirt.5 Kickstarter is best-known for this type of transaction, 
where a contributor might receive a promise for a robot-building kit in ex-
change for their pledge of $59 or more.6 Another variant is donation-based 
crowdfunding, where contributors donate their capital to fund a worthy cause.7
GoFundMe exemplifies this type of approach, where, for example, members of 
the public can donate to after-school chess programs in Chicago.8 Despite their 
differences, these crowdfunding devices all have one thing in common: they do 
not promise profits.
Initially, companies could not offer contributors profits over crowdfunding 
platforms unless they complied with the demanding reporting requirements of
the federal securities laws.  As I will discuss, any time a company sells a stake 
in its future profits, it is offering a security; offering a security triggers federal 
securities laws.9 The cost to comply with these laws is extensive.10 Smaller 
companies were deterred from offering securities as a way to raise money be-
cause of the high cost of compliance.  Thus, the potential to offer securities 
through crowdfunding remained untapped.11
Congress changed this restriction with the passage of Title III of the 
Jumpstart Our Business Act of 2012 (JOBS Act).12 Title III carved out an ex-
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., DAVID M. FREEDMAN & MATTHEW R. NUTTING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
CROWDFUNDING INCLUDING REWARDS, DONATION, DEBT, AND EQUITY PLATFORMS IN THE USA,
FREEDMAN-CHICAGO.COM, https://www.freedman-chicago.com/ec4i/History-of-Crowdfunding.pdf 
(last updated Nov. 5, 2015). 
5. Id.
6. Robotics Construction Kit by Geek Club, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/geeekclub/geeek-club-diy-robotics-kit?ref=section-homepage-view-more-discovery-p3 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Grade School Chess Team – South Side of Chicago, GOFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/f/grade-school-chess-team-south-side-of-chicago (last visited Dec. 31, 
2019).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See id.
11. See FREEDMAN & NUTTING, supra note 4.
12. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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emption for crowdfunding issuers from the public offering rules of the Securi-
ties Act.13 Under the JOBS Act, crowdfunding companies could offer shares in 
their profits without subjecting themselves to the high costs of federal securities 
laws.
But this change came at a new cost for crowdfunding issuers: they had to 
offer their securities through a registered intermediary.14 These intermediaries 
could be one of two types—either a broker-dealer or a new legislative vehicle 
called a “funding portal.” Funding portals were designed with two purposes in 
mind: to protect investors and to reduce the costs for issuers.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was charged with drafting 
the new rules for funding portal intermediaries but punted its drafting responsi-
bility to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  After a three-
year waiting period, the SEC adopted FINRA’s rules.  Notably, the SEC decid-
ed “not to impose any licensing, testing, or qualification requirements for asso-
ciated persons of funding portals.”15 Punting again, the SEC determined that 
FINRA was “well-positioned” to determine if a licensing requirement would be 
necessary for funding portal operators.16
Three years after the rules took effect, FINRA brought the first litigated en-
forcement action against a funding portal and its operator in Department of En-
forcement v. DreamFunded Marketplace, LLC.17 FINRA’s complaint contained 
ten causes of action and led to a 148-page decision.18
The operator, Manuel Fernandez, violated some of the most basic funding 
portal rules.  For his violations, Mr. Fernandez was barred from ever working 
with a funding portal, and his funding portal DreamFunded was expelled from 
FINRA membership.  The decision equated these sanctions to the securities law 
equivalent of capital punishment.
Mr. Fernandez’s violations point to a gap in the regulatory framework: the 
need for a licensing requirement for associated persons of funding portals.  
Without a licensing requirement, the motivations of the JOBS Act are thwart-
ed.19
This Note argues the lack of a licensing requirement for funding portal op-
erators increases compliance costs for funding portals, passing those costs onto 
issuers and inhibiting investor protection—the twin purposes of the JOBS Act.  
Part I is broken up into two sections.  The first section provides a background 
for what funding portals are and the requirements imposed on them by law.  The 
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,430 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274) [hereinafter Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release].
16. See infra note 70.
17. See Dep’t. of Enf’t v. DreamFunded Marketplace (DreamFunded), Disciplinary Pro-
ceeding No. 2017053428201, 2019 WL 3231289 at *8 (June 5, 2019).
18. Id.
19. See infra note 176.
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second section presents how DreamFunded failed to comply as a funding portal.  
Part II discusses why the DreamFunded decision will increase compliance costs 
for issuers and lead to less investor protection.  Part III addresses the problems 
in Part II by offering a framework for a licensing requirement motivated by the 
DreamFunded decision.
I. FUNDING PORTAL REQUIREMENTS AND HOW DREAMFUNDED 
RAN AFOUL OF THEM
A. Background of the Creation, Purpose, and Requirements for 
Funding Portals
In general, if a company wants to offer and sell any kind of security20 to the 
public, they must comply with the demanding registration and reporting re-
quirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act.21 Publicly offering securities is 
expensive—costing millions of dollars in legal and accounting fees.22 Thus, the 
cost of complying with these laws may outweigh the benefit for those who can-
not afford to comply such as small businesses with few or no assets.23 Such 
small businesses wishing to offer equity in their company may be cost-
prohibited from doing so.
Fortunately, the securities laws provide exemptions from Section 5, making 
offering securities more affordable.24 The exemptions available to businesses 
attempting to offer and sell securities through crowdfunding, however, were not 
legal until Congress passed the JOBS Act in April of 2012.25 Title III of the 
JOBS Act, also known as the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and 
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (CROWDFUND Act), created an exemption 
from Section 5 for crowdfunding issuers.26
20. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2012) (statutory definition of a 
security).
21. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2012) [hereinafter Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws] (describ-
ing Section 5 of the Securities Act as a “morass of prohibitions, exceptions, conditions, and excep-
tions to exceptions . . .”).
22. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 
1467 (2013).
23. See Bradford, supra note 21, at 7 (“Securities-based crowdfunding is practicable only if 
a new exemption is created”).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (West 2015) (“The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to . . . .”).
25. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106. §§301–05, 126 Stat. 306, 
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CROWDFUND Act]; Brad-
ford, supra note 21, at 10.
26. See CROWDFUND Act.
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Today, issuers can raise money through equity crowdfunding, so long as 
they raise no more than $1.07 million over a 12-month period,27 among other 
requirements.28 A crowdfunding issuer must file a Form C with the SEC for 
each offering of securities.29 The Form C must contain biographical and finan-
cial information of the issuer, the target amount of securities being sold and at 
what price, and a self-imposed deadline by the issuer to reach the targeted 
amount.30
Aside from filing a Form C, one of the key requirements for a crowdfunding 
issuer is that they must offer their securities through one of two intermediaries: 
a broker-dealer or a “funding portal.”31 While broker-dealers have served a role 
in some crowdfunding offerings,32 their incentive to act as an intermediary may 
be diminished given the low amount of potential commissions involved and the 
risk of liability. 33 In the first three years of equity crowdfunding, 90% of 
crowdfunding offerings occurred through funding portals.34
Funding portals are the main vehicle for crowdfunding offerings, and they 
serve three important functions.  First, they provide a forum for crowdfunding 
securities offerings to take place.35 Second, they act as gatekeepers, curating 
what information and which issuers make it on their site.36 Third, they were 
designed with efficiency in mind, providing a low-cost way for crowdfunding 
27. The original JOBS Act contemplated $1 million, but this was increased to account for 
inflation. See 17 C.F.R. 227.201(t) Instruction 7 (2019).
28. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (West 2015) (requiring 
that the maximum amount a crowdfunding issuer raise from an investor with an annual income or a 
net worth of under $100,000 be “the greater of $2000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth 
of such investor . . .”).
29. Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 71, 421.
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.201 (2017).
31. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (West 2015).
32. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION REGULATION 
CROWDFUNDING 27 (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf 
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE COMMISSION] (“In addition, nine registered broker-dealers participated 
in at least one crowdfunding offering . . . .”).
33. See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012) (predicting that broker-dealers will not have an incentive to partici-
pate in crowdfunding offerings); REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 27 (“Most offer-
ings (just under 90%) were conducted through funding portals, suggesting specialization in the mar-
ket.”). In terms of liability risk, an intermediary might face a Rule 10b-5 action under the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 or negligence at common law. See Cohn, supra, at 1441 n.23.
34. REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 3, 27.
35. See Van S. Wiltz, Will the JOBS Act Jump-Start the Video Game Industry? Crowdfund-
ing Start-Up Capital, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 141, 164 n.117 (2013) (calling a funding 
portal the initial forum for a crowdfunding transaction).
36. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 885 (2018).
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issuers to market their securities.37 These functions are reflected by the three 
legal texts that impose requirements on them: the CROWDFUND Act, the 
Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release (both passed through notice and com-
ment rulemaking by the SEC), 38 and the FINRA Funding Portal Rules (ap-
proved by SEC).39
These three functions—providing a forum, gatekeeping, and cost-saving—
are discussed in turn.
1.  Funding Portals as Communication Hubs
Funding portals are the forums for crowdfunding offerings.  This purpose is 
made clear by the fact that intermediaries exist as the only forum for issuers to 
offer and sell their securities.40 The idea behind this forum function was to cre-
ate a space for the “wisdom of the crowd” to discuss an offering, determine its 
merits, and choose whether or not to invest.41 The SEC believed that conduct-
ing an offering through one intermediary would help prevent information dilu-
tion about an offering and increase intermediary compliance with the rules.42
The crowdfunding rules mandate that funding portals must provide “channels 
through which investors can communicate with one another and with represent-
atives of the issuer about offerings made available on the intermediary’s plat-
form.”43 The reason behind this rule is to give investors a “centralized and 
transparent” forum to discuss their potential investment.44
By making funding portals the forum for offerings, the JOBS Act envi-
sioned funding portals acting as neutral “bulletin boards,” providing a place for 
securities offerings but not assisting in the offerings themselves.45 This purpose 
is clear from their definition; Congress defined funding portals not by what they 
are, but by what they are not allowed to do.46 Funding portals are not allowed 
to offer investment advice or recommendations; they may not solicit purchases, 
sales, or offers to buy securities that are displayed on their platforms; they may 
not compensate employees, agents, or other persons based on the sale of securi-
37. See Patrick Archambault, Note, How the SEC’s Crowdfunding Rules for Funding Portals 
Save the Two-Headed Snake: Drawing the Proper Balance Between Integrity and Cost, 49 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2016).
38. See generally Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15.
39. See Order Approving FINRA Proposed Rule Change to Adopt the Funding Portal Rules 
and Related Forms and Rule 4518., 81 Fed. Reg. 4931 (Jan. 28, 2016).
40. See Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 100, 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2017).
41. See Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 71, 388.
42. Id. at 31.
43. See Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 303(c), 17 C.F.R. § 227.303(c) (2018).
44. See Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 71, 446.
45. See Cohn, supra note 33, at 1439.
46. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2018) (n.b. the 
JOBS Act inadvertently defined “emerging growth company” under the exact same section as 
“funding portal”).
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ties displayed or referenced on its website or portal; nor may they hold, manage, 
possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; and finally, funding 
portals may not engage in activity that the SEC may, within its discretion, find 
inappropriate.47
To further facilitate its forum function, the JOBS Act imposes a 21-day 
waiting requirement (enforced by funding portals) for issuers to sell a security, 
allowing a window for investors to discuss and analyze the offering on the web-
site and share their views.48
2.  Funding Portals as Gatekeepers
Funding portals are gatekeepers designed to protect investors against 
fraud.49 Intermediaries themselves were added into the JOBS Act because of 
concerns raised in the Senate that the fraud protections in the House bill were 
insufficient to protect investors.50 In connection with this gatekeeping function, 
the JOBS Act mandates that intermediaries must “take measures to reduce the 
risk of fraud” with respect to crowdfunding offerings and sales.51 At a mini-
mum, the JOBS Act requires that funding portals conduct background checks 
on the control persons of every issuer on its site to ensure that the issuer or its 
officers have not committed any violations of the securities laws.52 Notably, a 
funding portal must have a “reasonable basis for believing” that an issuer is in 
compliance with the relevant legal requirements; if they do not have that rea-
sonable basis, a funding portal must deny that issuer access to their platform.53
To protect investors against fraud, funding portals are also required to per-
form ongoing review of the information provided by their issuers.  They must 
establish and maintain a system for supervising issuers that is “reasonably de-
signed” to achieve compliance with the laws associated with them.54 They are 
also prohibited from making available or distributing a “false, exaggerated, 
promissory, or misleading statement or claim.”55 Mimicking the language of 
Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions, funding portals are prohibited from “effect-
ing any transaction in, or inducing the purchase or sale of any security by means 
47. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(80)(A)-(E).
48. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(6) (2018).
49. See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 926.
50. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals 
Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 177 (2013); see also Cohen, supra note 33, at
1439.
51. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(6) (2018).
52. See id.
53. Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 301(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.301(c)(2) (2018); Regula-
tion Crowdfunding Rule 402(b)(10) (2018).
54. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 300(a) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/300.
55. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(c)(2)(A)(i) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.
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of, or by aiding and abetting, any manipulative deceptive or fraudulent device 
of contrivance.”56 In general, funding portals are held to a high ethical respon-
sibility to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.”57
In tandem with reviewing issuer information to protect investors, funding 
portals must maintain a level of neutrality with the issuers on their sites.58 The 
CROWDFUND Act prohibits a funding portal’s directors or officers from hav-
ing a financial interest in an issuer on the platform.59 Additionally, funding por-
tals are not allowed to handle investor funds.60 During the offering period, an 
investor’s capital is held in escrow by a third party—not by the funding portal.61
An investor is allowed to request a return of their investment during the offering 
period, and only when the target amount is reached may a funding portal release 
the funds to the issuer.62 If the target amount is not reached, all of the existing 
investor’s funds are returned, and the offering closes.63
Intermediaries also help investors by informing them.  They are required to 
give notice to investors of any material change to the offering or the information 
about the offering provided by an issuer.64 Funding portals must also retain 
records related to their business for five years.65 This recordkeeping function 
allows for oversight of a funding portal’s performance of its gatekeeping role.66
Funding portals also serve investors by providing educational materials and 
risk disclosures on their sites.67 Yet even though they are responsible for edu-
cating investors, funding portals and their associated persons are neither re-
quired to be educated in the federal securities laws nor the requirements for 
56. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(b) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.
57. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(a) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.
58. See Jacques F. Baritot, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding Investors Under the 
JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 277 (2013).
59. See Securities Act § 4A(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(11) (2018); see also Heminway,
supra note 50, at 197 (noting that the lack of financial interest “may constrain wrongful conduct by 
cutting off potential sources of conflicting interests”).
60. See Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 303(e)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.303(e)(2) (2018).
61. See id.
62. Securities Act § 4A(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2018).
63. See Crowdfunding Rule 201(g), 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(g) (2018) (“The target offering 
amount and the deadline to reach the target offering amount, including a statement that if the sum of 
the investment commitments does not equal or exceed the target offering amount at the offering 
deadline, no securities will be sold in the offering . . . investment commitments . . . will be re-
turned . . . .”).
64. Crowdfunding Rule 304(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.304(c)(1) (2018).
65. Crowdfunding Rule 404, 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.404 (2018).
66. Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 172–73.
67. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3) (2018).
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funding portals and their associated persons.68 The SEC considered whether to 
subject funding portals to a licensing requirement,69 and ultimately decided to 
leave the issue of licensing to percolate for FINRA to determine whether one 
was necessary.70
3.  A Funding Portal was Meant to be Cost-Effective
A funding portal was meant to be cost-effective to decrease the initial cost 
of doing business for issuers. 71 Funding portals are exempted from broker-
dealer status (and the correlated, demanding requirements) so long as they meet 
three conditions:72 they must “remain subject to the examination, enforcement, 
and other rulemaking authority of the SEC”; they must be a member of 
FINRA; 73 and finally, funding portals must subject themselves to other re-
quirements that the SEC deems appropriate.74 Unlike the fourteen requirements 
for broker-dealer applicants, funding portal applicants must only meet five.75 In 
addition to their requirement to have a supervisory system in place and keep 
records, applicants seeking to become funding portals must not have been sub-
ject to a disqualifying event; they must have established relationships with 
banks, escrow agents; and they must have disclosed all their sources of financ-
68. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *6 (“[T]he applicable rules do not require [an 
associated person] to take any classes or training, or to take any licensing or qualifying examination 
to qualify to operate a funding portal.”)
69. Crowdfunding Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,460 (Nov. 5, 2013) (“121. The proposed rules do not independently 
establish licensing or other qualifications requirements for intermediaries and their associated per-
sons . . . Would licensing or other qualifications for intermediaries and their associated persons be 
necessary, for example, to provide assurances that those persons are sufficiently and knowledgeable 
and qualified to operate funding portal?”) [hereinafter Crowdfunding Rules Proposing Release].
70. Crowdfunding Rules Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 115 (“We believe that 
[FINRA] is well positioned . . . to determine whether to propose additional requirements such as 
licensing, testing, or qualification requirements for associated persons of funding portals.”).
71. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *73.
72. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2018).
73. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(h)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h)(1)(B) (noting that 
a funding portal is exempt from broker-dealer status if it “is a member of a national securities asso-
ciation registered under section 78o-3 of this title . . . ,” and at the time of this writing, FINRA is the 
only such entity).
74. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2018).
75. See Standards for Admission, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/
finra-standards-admission (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (standards for broker dealers); see also
FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed Funding Portal Rules and Related Forms, FINRA, 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/13-34 (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) (“These five consol-
idated standards address a funding portal’s: (1) ability to comply with applicable federal securities 
laws, rules and regulations and FINRA’s Funding Portal Rules; (2) contractual or other arrange-
ments and business relationships necessary to initiate operations; (3) supervisory system; (4) direct 
and indirect funding sources; and (5) recordkeeping system . . . .”).
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ing.76 However, funding portals are not required to conduct due diligence on 
the issuers on their site, and they are entitled to rely on an issuer’s representa-
tions, which reduces the costs of becoming a funding portal.77
B. DreamFunded and How it Ran Afoul of these Requirements
DreamFunded, headed by CEO and co-creator Manuel Fernandez, was es-
tablished in March 2016.78 Its registration as a funding portal with FINRA be-
gan in July 2016 and ended in November 2017.79 While DreamFunded was 
registered, it acted as an intermediary in fifteen crowdfunding offerings.80 Over 
its lifetime, the portal itself raised at total of $15,000 for two issuers.81 Because 
Fernandez was the CEO of DreamFunded, he constituted an “associated person”
of the portal, and so was subject to FINRA enforcement.82 Fernandez had no 
experience working in the securities industry, nor was he required to have any.83
However, he stated that he took courses at Stanford University in an executive 
education graduate school program and was a certified paralegal.84
DreamFunded and Fernandez violated the laws and regulations for funding 
portals.85 The decision, brought by the FINRA’s Department of Enforcement, 
is the first litigated case of its kind involving a funding portal.86 The case was 
heard before a three person panel, the Hearing Panel,87 and dealt with three dif-
ferent offerings for three different companies: Company A, Company B, and 
Company C.88 Company A was a social networking company, which allowed 
users to post content over different social media sites at the same time.89 Com-
76. See FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 110(a)(9)(B) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/110.
77. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *4.
78. Id. at *23.
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id. at *63.
81. Id. at *21.
82. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 100(b)(1) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/100.
83. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *6.
84. Id. at *19.
85. See id.
86. Joseph L. Zales et al., Dream On—FINRA Issues Its First Litigated Enforcement Action 
Against a Crowdfunding Portal, A.B.A. BUS. L. SECTION (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/08/dream-finra-issues-first-litigated-enforcement-action-
crowdfunding-portal/. 
87. See Adjudications & Decisions, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/
adjudication-decisions (last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (“[The Office of Hearing Officers] arranges a 
three-person panel to hear the case”); Standards for Admission, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/finra-standards-admission (last visited Dec. 31, 
2019) (setting standards for broker dealers).
88. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *27, *37, *39.
89. Id.
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pany B produced an application that provided a library of self-help videos to 
users.90 Unlike the other two offerings, Company C did not create an applica-
tion but invented a new type of fire hose attached with a harness, which was in-
vented to “lessen fatigue and decrease injuries to firefighters.”91
For their violations, DreamFunded was expelled from funding portal mem-
bership and Fernandez was barred from associating with any funding portal in 
the future.92 What did Fernandez and DreamFunded do to deserve “the securi-
ties industry equivalent of capital punishment”?93
The complaint against DreamFunded and Fernandez contained ten causes of 
action, but only two of the counts led to Fernandez and his portal’s expulsion.94
First, Fernandez failed to cooperate with FINRA by evading requests for infor-
mation under FINRA Rule 8210 95 when he was suspected of violating the 
rules.96 Second, the Hearing Panel imposed these extreme sanctions because 
Fernandez and DreamFunded violated 200(b) of the Funding Portal Rules: “ef-
fecting a securities transaction by any manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent 
device or contrivance.”97 Along with these larger violations, DreamFunded and 
Fernandez violated many of the basic requirements related to a funding portal’s
gatekeeping function.98
I will first discuss the basic violations that did not lead to Fernandez and his 
portal’s expulsion.  Next, I will discuss the more egregious violations—the Rule 
200(b) violation followed by the FINRA Rule 8210 evasion.  Finally, as a tran-
sition to this Note’s principal argument, I will point to the aggravating and miti-
gating factors the Hearing Panel considered before sanctioning Fernandez and 
DreamFunded.
1.  Violations of the Most Basic Requirements for Funding Portals
DreamFunded displayed “a systemic compliance breakdown,” especially 
with those requirements geared towards their gatekeeping function.99 Neither 
DreamFunded nor Fernandez conducted background checks on the issuers on 
their site, in violation of their statutory mandate to do so.100 Further, “[respond-
90. Id. at *37.
91. Id. at *39.
92. Id. at *9, *12 (the first and third causes of action, respectively).
93. Id. at *106 (quoting Saad v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 718 F.3d 904, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
94. Id. at *9, *12.
95. See infra note 156 (noting that an 8210 request is effectively a subpoena).
96. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289, at *110.
97. Id. at *111.
98. See discussion infra Part I.B.1; DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289, at *111.
99. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289, at *110.
100. Id. at *111.
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ents] failed to implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed 
to achieve compliance.”101
This systemic compliance breakdown is best exemplified by the offering for 
Company A on the DreamFunded site.102 Company A made an offering for 
100,000 securities for a target amount of $10,000 on October 28, 2016 with a 
closing date of September 26, 2017.103 Company A’s Form C was inadequate 
in several respects.  It did not tell investors how they could get their money 
back except through a “future merger or acquisition” and had no financial 
statement attached.104 Fernandez did not review the company’s Form C, but 
nevertheless allowed the offering on the site.105
Over the course of five months, Company A’s CEO made three material 
amendments to the offering’s Form C, which triggered Fernandez’s obligation 
to notify investors.106 A notice to investors must state that an investor’s com-
mitment will be canceled unless the investor reconfirms within five days.107
The first two amendments, made in January 2017, changed the number of secu-
rities being offered, the voting power in the company, and the date of organiza-
tion.108 Nevertheless, Fernandez provided no notice to investors and was even 
unaware he had to do so.109
After the first two amendments to the offering’s Form C, the CEO of Com-
pany A asked Fernandez to lower the target amount of the offering from 
$10,000 to $4,500.110 Fernandez was informed by his attorney that Company A 
would need to file a change in their Form C in order to lower the target 
amount.111 Soon afterward, the CEO of Company A informed Fernandez that 
he wanted to close the offering at an even lower amount because “his account 
was overdrawn.” 112 At this point, the Hearing Panel found that Fernandez 
would have had a “reasonable basis” to believe that, “at a minimum, there were 
investor protection concerns.”113 This would trigger an obligation by Fernandez 
101. Id. at *112; see also Crowdfunding Rule 403(a), 17 C.F.R. § 227.403(a) (2020).
102. A similar fact pattern to the one described infra Section I.B.1 also occurred with Com-
pany B. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *38–39.
103. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *30.
104. Id. at *29.
105. Id.
106. See id. at *30; Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 304(c), 17 C.F.R. § 227.304(c) (2018).
107. Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 304, 17 C.F.R. § 227.304.
108. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *30.
109. See id. at *108.
110. Id. at *31.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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to boot the offering off the site.114 Yet, Fernandez allowed the issuer’s offering 
to remain.115
In June 2017, Company A filed a third amendment to its Form C, lowering 
the target amount of the offering from $10,000 to $4,000.116 Again, Fernandez 
provided no notice of the change to the investors of Company A.117 The offer-
ing closed a week after Company A made this last amendment and three months 
before it was scheduled to close (September 2017).118 Fernandez provided in-
vestors no notice of the early closing date.119
A month later, Fernandez emailed his attorney asking if he had violated any 
of the rules associated with Company A.120 His attorney responded, “[i]t looks 
like it.”121 Fernandez tried to fix the issue retroactively by asking investors in 
Company A if they wanted their money returned. 122 Most investors recon-
firmed that they did not, except for one person.123 Fernandez and DreamFunded 
produced no evidence that they returned this individual’s investment.124
In addition to failing to perform its most basic gatekeeping role, Dream-
Funded “failed to give investors required notice and information,” and lacked a 
“system for complying with the notice requirements . . . depriving investors of 
information necessary to protect their rights.” 125 This systemic compliance 
breakdown, however, was not what prompted FINRA to bar DreamFunded and 
Fernandez from association.
2.  Expulsion by Misrepresentation
DreamFunded and Fernandez’s path to expulsion began when a staff mem-
ber of the FINRA Membership Application Program (MAP) group noticed a 
clip of Company C on YouTube.126 The clip came from a show on CNBC 
called “Make Me a Millionaire Inventor,” which is a Shark Tank-style show 
where inventors pitch their products to potential investors. 127 DreamFunded
114. Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 301(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 227.301(c)(1) (2018); Dream-
Funded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *31.
115. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *31.
116. Id. at *33.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at *34.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *35.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *112.
126. Id. at *7.
127. See CNBC’s ‘Make Me a Millionaire Inventor’ Returns for Season 2 on Thursday, Octo-
ber 6th at 10PM ET/PT, CNBC (Sep. 19, 2016, 11:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/19/
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was advertised as “a crowdfunding platform that [had] invested $100 million in 
startups.”128 However, the show was produced in January 2016—prior to when 
the crowdfunding rules took effect and prior to when DreamFunded registered 
as a funding portal.
During the video, Fernandez heard a pitch for a new type of firehose and in-
formation about the potential market for the product.129 After hearing the pitch, 
one of the hosts of the show asked Fernandez if he was going to make an of-
fer.130 Fernandez responded: “OK. I’ll make you an offer on behalf of Dream-
Funded.com.  Million dollars for 30% of the company.  How’s that sound?”131
After the pitch and Fernandez’s offer, Company C became an issuer on 
DreamFunded’s portal.132 When the show came out, Fernandez advertised it 
everywhere he could: on the DreamFunded site, on YouTube, and on his per-
sonal Twitter feed.133
The offer presented an initial issue for the portal: officers and directors of a 
funding portal, like Fernandez, are not allowed to have a financial stake in the
issuers on their site. 134 In November 2016, the MAP staff member sent an 
email to Fernandez asking about each of the fifteen offerings on the site and 
specifically, whether the funding portal or any of its officers or directors had 
invested in the offerings.135 Fernandez responded that two offerings, Company 
B and Company C, had been given “verbal, non-binding agreements” that indi-
cated that DreamFunded “would be invested in investing.”136 MAP pressed fur-
ther, and in January 2017, Fernandez said that after more investigation, he had 
decided not to invest in either.137 This seemed to allay concerns—if there was 
no investment by an officer or director of the funding portal, there was no viola-
tion.138
Moving past this first issue, the video presented a new potential rule viola-
tion: the clip where Fernandez appeared to make an offer to Company C could 
be considered “false and misleading” because Fernandez had not in fact invest-
cnbcs-make-me-a-millionaire-inventor-returns-for-season-two-on-thursday-october-6th-at-10pm-
etpt.html. 
128. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *40 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. at *39.
130. Id. at *40.
131. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
132. See id. at *21 (“The program was filmed months before the Portal’s crowdfunding plat-
form was even in operation . . . .”).
133. Id. at *20.
134. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(11) (2018).
135. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *42.
136. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
266 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:251
ed in Company C.139 The video was on the DreamFunded website, Facebook, 
and Twitter until February 2017.140 In April, MAP received an email from Fer-
nandez’s attorney, who stated that the video had been taken down.141 Despite 
this assurance, the video appeared again on the website months later in Septem-
ber 2017 and surfaced periodically from the fall of 2016 until the spring of  
2017.142
The video contained “two falsehoods,” and Fernandez had knowledge of 
both.143 First, the video misrepresented that Fernandez had invested over $100 
million in startups, and second that Fernandez had invested in Company C.144
Neither was true, and  the Hearing Panel concluded that the misrepresentation 
“greatly inflated Fernandez’s wealth, ability to raise capital, and investment 
savvy” as well as that “an investment in Company C would be a good invest-
ment.”145 This violation was what the Hearing Panel found to be the “truly cul-
pable,” distinguishing it from all of the other violations.146
Along with these falsehoods, the Hearing Panel found that Fernandez and 
DreamFunded misrepresented that they had performed due diligence akin to 
that of more sophisticated intermediaries. 147 Fernandez represented on the 
DreamFunded site that he had a deal-flow screening team for each offering that 
“recognizes the best practices guide as outlined by the Angel Capital Associa-
tion.”148 Fernandez also claimed that “DreamFunded ha[d] recruited a world-
class investment committee to review the due diligence previously completed 
by angel groups and VC [venture capital] partners to assure each deal sourced 
from a third party me[t] DreamFunded standards for anticipated investment per-
formance.”149 In reality, however, Fernandez had no screening team or process 
for “evaluating issuers or their offerings.” 150 As he disclosed in an on-the-
record interview with FINRA officials, Fernandez likely met with the issuer’s 
founder, did some online research, and looked at their LinkedIn profile.151 Fer-
nandez’s description of his due diligence “was false and misleading,” and he 
knew or recklessly disregarded the risk that his due diligence representations 
139. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(c)(2)(A)(i) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.
140. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *44.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *111.
143. Id. at *88.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *105.
147. Id. at *89–90.
148. Id. at *89 (internal quotations omitted). See ANGEL CAPITAL ASS’N,
http://angelcapitalassociation.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
149. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *89 (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id. at *90.
151. See id.
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would mislead investors about the thoroughness of his investigation.152 While 
DreamFunded was not required to perform due diligence,153 Fernandez’s de-
scription of his due diligence he did not in fact perform was materially mislead-
ing to investors.154
Because of all of these misrepresentations, “which involve[d] no reliance on 
others,” Fernandez and his funding portal were barred from association with 
FINRA.155
3.  Expulsion by Evasion
Leading up to the hearing, the FINRA MAP office and the Office of Fraud 
Detection and Market Intelligence (OFDMI) made several Rule 8210 requests 
investigating DreamFunded and Fernandez.  A Rule 8210 request allows 
FINRA to investigate and require persons under its jurisdiction to produce doc-
uments and be subjected to investigation.156 Fernandez fought the notice, some-
times indicating that he was going to comply and at other times challenging 
FINRA’s jurisdiction.157
After the initial Rule 8210 requests for documents, Fernandez had an on-
the-record interview with FINRA’s OFDMI on October 20, 2017.158 On Octo-
ber 24, OFDMI initiated another Rule 8210 request for financial records, bank 
account statements, and investor agreements.159 In early November, while this 
new request was ongoing, Fernandez began settlement discussions with 
FINRA160 and unregistered DreamFunded as a funding portal.161
In mid-December, Fernandez’s counsel negotiated an extension for the pro-
duction of documents and another on the record interview with OFDMI (and 
Enforcement).162 FINRA granted an extension to January 5, 2018 for the re-
quest for documents and another interview for January 18, 2018.163
152. Id.
153. Id. at *4.
154. See id. at *90.
155. Id. at *111.
156. See FINRA, RULE 8210(a) (2013), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-
rules/8210 (“FINRA staff shall have the right to: (1) require a member, person associated with a 
member, or any other person subject to FINRA’s jurisdiction to provide information orally, in writ-
ing, or electronically . . . and to testify at a location specified by FINRA staff . . . and (2) inspect and 
copy the books, records, and accounts of such member or person with respect to any matter in-
volved in the investigation . . . .”).
157. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *8.
158. See id. at *24–25.
159. See id. at *74.
160. See id. at *53.
161. See id. *24.
162. Id. at *53.
163. Id.
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On January 5, 2018 counsel for Fernandez produced a limited number of 
documents, stating that his client, Fernandez, had not given him what he need-
ed.164 The production of documents was extended again to January 19.165
On January 19, counsel asked OFDMI for another extension, citing that his 
client had medical issues.166 Fernandez may have been sick, but maybe not as 
sick as he let on—he spent the weekend at the Sundance Film Festival and pos-
ing with a famous NFL football quarterback on Twitter.167
“[Apparently] unaware of Fernandez’s weekend travels,” FINRA granted a 
final extension to January 29 for the production of documents.168 On January 
25, Fernandez’s counsel alerted FINRA that he no longer represented Fernan-
dez; FINRA promptly sent Fernandez an email, reminding him of his obligation 
to respond by January 29.169 Fernandez replied on January 29, asking for an-
other extension.170 FINRA responded that Fernandez had been given three ex-
tensions over three months for the October 24 request and that if he did not pro-
duce documents by February 6, Enforcement would file a complaint. 171 On 
February 6, Fernandez produced no documents and emailed Enforcement say-
ing, “[t]oday I am getting back to work, and to me, it does not make sense that 
you want all the docs today, a day after I just returned to work.”172
Enforcement filed a complaint on February 23, 2018.173 Addressing the 
complaint, the Hearing Panel applied the FINRA Sanction Guidelines.174 The 
panel found that the standard for a complete failure to respond to a Rule 8210 
request is a bar.175
The Hearing Panel assessed Fernandez and DreamFunded’s Rule 8210 eva-
sion based on three considerations: first, the importance of the information that 
was requested but not provided; second, the number of requests made, the time 
it took the respondent to respond, and the degree of pressure needed to get a re-
sponse; and third, whether there were one or more valid reasons for the defi-
ciency in the response.176
First, the Hearing Panel deemed the Rule 8210 information “critical” to En-
forcement’s investigation because the information sought—bank statements—
164. Id. at *81.
165. See id.
166. Id. at *53, *81.
167. Id. at *54.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *55.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES (2019), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/
Sanctions_Guidelines.pdf.
175. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *105.
176. Id.
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would have been used to determine if “Fernandez had misused investor funds 
intended for investment in the DreamFunded Portal.”177 Without all the bank 
statements, it would be impossible to know whether Fernandez used his person-
al account and the portal’s account interchangeably. 178 Second, the Hearing 
Panel found the degree of pressure was “high” because of the number of re-
quests and number of extensions “over the course of several months.”179 Final-
ly, the Hearing Panel found that there was no valid reason for Fernandez’s lack 
of response; they concluded the opposite was true—Fernandez had claimed to 
be sick when he was traveling.180
[F]or [failing] to comply fully and completely to the Rule 8210 request,”
DreamFunded was expelled as a funding portal and Fernandez was barred from 
associating with “any funding portal FINRA member.”181
4.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The Hearing Panel discussed the aggravating and mitigating factors that 
were relevant to Enforcement’s case against Fernandez and DreamFunded.  In 
particular, the decision concluded that Fernandez’s attempt to blame his lawyers 
for “failing to make documents available to FINRA staff,” his “false and mis-
leading information given to regulatory inquiries,” and his “attempts to delay 
the investigation” all served as aggravating factors for his sanctions.  However, 
the Hearing Panel noted:
To some degree, [DreamFunded and Fernandez]’s violations may be partly at-
tributable to the lack of experience and training.  It became clear at the hearing that, 
despite several years of promoting the creation of the equity crowdfunding market-
place, Fernandez did not have a good grasp of even the most basic rules governing 
crowdfunding and funding portals.  He testified, for example, that he never under-
stood that he was an associated person of the DreamFunded Portal until his current 
attorney told him that a couple months into the hearing.
182
The panel was quick to note, however, that “[t]his potentially mitigating 
factor [was] outweighed . . . by Fernandez’s pattern of providing false and mis-
leading information to regulators.” 183 Fernandez’s egregious violations, far 
from being a one-off case, display a deep regulatory flaw in the system: a lack 
of an educational mechanism for funding portals’ associated persons.
177. Id. at *107.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *107.
181. Id. at *110.
182. Id. at *108 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
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II. WITHOUT AN EDUCATIONAL MECHANISM, THE TWIN PURPOSES OF THE 
JOBS ACT ARE THWARTED
The DreamFunded decision sends two messages that, when taken together, 
demonstrate a need for an educational mechanism for funding portals in order to 
preserve the goals of Title III of the JOBS Act (also known as the 
CROWDFUND Act).  The CROWDFUND Act has two goals: capital for-
mation and investor protection.184
DreamFunded’s first message aligns with the first purpose of the JOBS Act: 
investor protection.  The decision shows us that a funding portal can violate 
their gatekeeping role because they either do not appreciate their role or are ig-
norant of it.  That is a troubling signal for investor protection, given that crowd-
funding investors are retail investors, not accredited investors.185 The need for 
investor protection is high, but the bar for the gatekeepers responsible for inves-
tor protection is low.  Therefore, in order to serve the goal of investor protec-
tion, I argue that a licensing requirement should be implemented to increase the 
bar for gatekeepers.
The second message goes to capital formation.  There are two types of fund-
ing portals: those that wish to comply with the regulations and those that do not 
or will not.  The DreamFunded decision generates an increased cost for both.186
These increased costs will be passed onto issuers, threatening the “capital for-
mation” purpose of the JOBS Act.  A licensing requirement on funding portals 
would meet the DreamFunded decision head-on, reducing the prohibitive cost 
to intermediaries and, by extension, issuers.
I will discuss each of these two messages in turn because they both point to 
the need for a licensing requirement.
A. A Licensing Requirement and Investor Protection
The JOBS Act made it clear that the role of crowdfunding intermediaries 
was to serve a gatekeeping function to protect investors.187 There is no ques-
tion: the rules are complicated.188 But even as complicated as they are, the rules
are designed with the purpose of protecting investors.189 The kind of investors 
that crowdfunding offerings attract, like the ones at issue in the DreamFunded
decision, are in particular need of protection.  They are, by and large, unaccred-
ited—making them less able to “fend for themselves.”190 The theory behind 
184. See CROWDFUND Act, supra note 25 (“[A]n Act to increase American job creation 
and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets.”).
185. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 22.
186. See discussion infra Part II.
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *8.
189. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 119 (2017).
190. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
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securities laws is that the less informed and the less sophisticated an investor is, 
the more likely it will be that an issuer will take advantage of them.191 This 
means that the types of investors at issue in DreamFunded were in particular 
need of a gatekeeper to protect them against abuse.  However, DreamFunded 
and Fernandez recklessly failed to serve the investors on their site.
Consider the two violations that independently led to Fernandez’s expul-
sion.  First, Fernandez failed to respond to a Rule 8210 inquiry, systematically 
evading enforcement.  Second, he posted, and continued to post, an offering that 
he did not intend to complete for a company hosted on his website, violating the 
funding portal rules.192 These are relatively easy requirements to meet.  Ulti-
mately, all Enforcement was requesting from Fernandez was bank statements.  
And taking down a video from YouTube, Twitter, or a site under Fernandez’s
direct control would not have been difficult.  Fernandez’s failure to comply with 
these basic requirements shows a deep misunderstanding of, and lack of appre-
ciation for, his role as a gatekeeper.  Fernandez did not even know he was an 
associated person of a funding portal until his lawyer at the hearing told him.193
How can someone act as a gatekeeper unless they know that they are a gate-
keeper?
Now consider Fernandez’s state of mind: he was either a bad actor who 
recklessly disregarded his gatekeeping responsibilities or a well-intentioned one 
severely misinformed of his role.  I will discuss the facts that point to both pos-
sibilities and why each one leads to the need for a licensing requirement.
In all likelihood, Fernandez was simply a bad actor, evading enforcement 
when he was backed up against a wall.  It was his culpability that led to his 
sanctions, not the violations themselves.194 The facts of the case suggested that 
Fernandez’s portal was not succeeding, which is what motivated Fernandez to 
post the Company C video clip.195 Fernandez posted the fake investment for $1 
million in Company C to boost publicity for his site, and likely didn’t care that 
he was responsible for protecting investors.196 After taking down the video clip, 
Fernandez posted it again, likely for the same promotional reason.  He ran from 
FINRA enforcement, mispresenting that he was sick, and he failed to produce 
the most basic information that would allow FINRA to “perform its regulatory 
mission.”197
If Fernandez was a bad actor, it makes the need for a licensing requirement 
all the more necessary.  A licensing requirement would serve as a filtering 
191. See id.
192. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *11; see FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE
200(b) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.  
193. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *108.
194. Id. at *95.
195. Id. at *67 (“[T]he model has not worked for us.”).
196. Id. at *41 (“[Fernandez’s] purpose in posting the video clip with the $1 million offer was 
to generate publicity.”).
197. Id. at *107.
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mechanism, keeping out actors like Fernandez.  Licensing requirements in-
crease compliance with the rules and will necessarily filter out some bad actors 
at the outset.  The fact that Fernandez and DreamFunded were allowed to regis-
ter with FINRA demonstrates that some fraudulent actors are making it through 
the vetting process.  And further, FINRA began its investigation of Fernandez 
because they had just dealt with a funding portal with a financial interest in its 
issuer.198 This other case may have been less extreme than DreamFunded, but 
it suggests another example of a funding portal recklessly disregarding its gate-
keeping role.  An absence of a financial interest in an issuer is a crucial re-
quirement for a funding portal to serve as a “neutral third party.”199 The need to 
prevent funding portals from violating this requirement is necessary to safe-
guard investors, and a licensing mechanism would filter out some bad actors 
who will break the rules.
But let us look at Fernandez in the most positive light and assume that he 
was not a bad actor but was simply misinformed about his role as a gatekeeper.  
There are some facts that point in this direction.  Fernandez commented on the 
proposed rules for equity crowdfunding before they took effect, praising a high 
barrier to entry for funding portals.200 Further, when Fernandez reviewed his 
attorney’s prepared policies and procedures for DreamFunded’s site, he did not 
believe they applied to him or the portal. 201 When Fernandez established 
DreamFunded, his relationship with FINRA suggested a desire to comply with 
the rules. 202 From these facts, it appears that Fernandez was simply misin-
formed of his role as a gatekeeper.
If Fernandez was simply misinformed of his role, he violated the relevant 
rules in such a systemic way that demands an educational requirement even for 
non-complying actors who are well-intentioned.  He did not conduct back-
ground checks for the control persons of the issuers on his site, providing no 
screening to protect investors.203 He did not keep records, saying that he did not 
consider them “important.”204 The offerings for Company A and Company B 
closed early, and Fernandez disbursed the funds for those offerings without 
198. Id. at *41.
199. See Baritot, supra note 58, at 277.
200. Manny Fernandez, File No. S7-09-13, Comment on Proposed Rule Crowdfunding (Jan. 
8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-105.htm (“I think the proposed rules [for 
Crowdfunding] provides [sic] a high barrier to equity crowdfunding portals aka funding portals. 
Which is good because it will stop anyone from potentially creating a funding portal over a week-
end.”).
201. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *133 ([T]he [policies were] drafted at a very high 
level . . . . When [Fernandez] looked at them, he testified that they looked ‘more like [a] brokerage 
firm[‘]s [document] or something. I don’t think it really applies here.’”).
202. Id. at *61 (“[FINRA staff] advised Fernandez of aspects of its website that were incon-
sistent with regulatory requirements, and Fernandez made changes to the website in response.”).
203. Id. at *124–25.
204. Id. at *12.
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providing investors the required notice.205 However, once he was aware of his 
misstep, he attempted to remedy it by contacting investors.206 This suggests 
that a well-intentioned Fernandez would have acted differently had he been in-
formed of his role as a gatekeeper.  He may have wanted to comply with the 
rules, but without an understanding of his role, he could not carry out his obli-
gations.  An educational requirement that appraised Fernandez of his role would 
have solved this issue.  If Fernandez’s intent was to conform with the rules, an 
educational requirement would have better informed him of his obligations.  If 
he had been better informed of his obligations, the chances that Fernandez 
would have complied would have been higher.  Given how much of a gap there
was between what Fernandez was expected to do and what he actually did, an 
educational requirement could have prevented his misstep and could have pre-
vented his bar.  Thus, it should have been required at the outset.
Whether Fernandez was a bad actor or simply acted out of ignorance, one 
thing is clear: with a licensing requirement in place, the chances that he would 
have complied with his role would have been higher.  Fernandez stepped into a 
complex regulatory regime that put him at the center of investor protection, yet 
he failed to appreciate this responsibility.  The JOBS Act created funding por-
tals specifically to protect investors, so funding portals must appreciate their 
role as gatekeepers.  If funding portals do not appreciate their role, the regulato-
ry structure will collapse under its own weight due to well-intentioned and bad 
actors alike.
Fernandez represents a case study in the need for a licensing requirement, 
but he likely does not stand alone in his noncompliance.  While he presented the 
first fact pattern of how far a funding portal can stray from the path, there is a 
“culture of noncompliance” in the security crowdfunding space.207 Issuers are 
generally not meeting their most basic and simple requirements,208 and interme-
diaries, as the gatekeepers, are to blame.  While data is still emerging, this cul-
ture of noncompliance “begs the question” of a pattern of extreme fraud that 
may be a smoking gun for even further cases like DreamFunded.209 There is 
“considerable latency in fraud schemes,”210 but we should not wait to find out.  
205. See id. at *33, *39.
206. See id. at *35.
207. See generally, Mercer Bullard, Crowdfunding’s Culture of Noncompliance: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
208. See id. (“In almost half of the first 362 offerings in the sample, the issuer failed to file at 
least one of the 4 required financial statements or obtain the required level review for their financial 
statements. Only 61 percent of issuers filed their mandatory initial annual report; only 37 percent 
filed it on time. Barely one quarter of issuers that were required to file two annual reports did so. 
Only 15 percent of successful issuers filed the required report on the final amount raised, most issu-
er’s electronically filed data include substantial deviations from the data in their financial state-
ments, and one platform may be violating the prohibition against crowdfunding portal’s providing 
advice.”).
209. Id.
210. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 13.
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If funding portals are the gatekeepers against fraud, a licensing requirement is 
necessary to preserve the first purpose of the JOBS Act: investor protection.
B. A Licensing Requirement and Capital Formation
Funding portals have one source of customer revenue: the issuers on their 
site.  Funding portals charge the issuers on their site either in the form of equity 
in the issuing company or in the form of fees.211 If compliance costs for crowd-
funding intermediaries increase, those costs will have to be passed on to issuers, 
thwarting the capital formation purpose of the JOBS Act.212
I will argue that the DreamFunded decision will increase compliance costs 
for intermediaries, which will be passed on to issuers.  A licensing requirement 
solves these increased costs.  While a licensing requirement will surely add to 
the startup costs of intermediaries, it will greatly offset that cost by decreasing 
increased compliance costs in the wake of DreamFunded.  A licensing require-
ment will increase the reputation of funding portals generally, creating a more 
efficient market for equity crowdfunding.  I will begin by discussing why 
DreamFunded increases costs for funding portals.
DreamFunded increases compliance costs for funding portals because the 
decision implies a due diligence requirement for funding portals.  While the 
Hearing Panel decision stated multiple times that there “is no due diligence” re-
quirement for funding portals,213 their ruling strongly implied one.214 The Hear-
ing Panel likely reiterated that there was no diligence requirement for funding 
portals in order to allay concerns that compliance costs would increase.  But in 
doing so, they created ambiguity as to what is necessary for funding portal 
compliance.  A funding portal must have a “reasonable basis” for believing that 
a crowdfunding issuer is in compliance with the laws and regulations, or they 
must remove that issuer or the offering from the site.215 This reasonable basis 
standard has long hinted at the possibility of a due diligence requirement, but 
this opinion magnifies that possibility.216 In order to achieve compliance, the 
211. See generally, Jack Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 543 (2017) (comparing the various costs that intermediaries charge issuers).
212. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 33–34 (stating that costs that inter-
mediaries incur complying with FINRA Funding Portal Rules are passed onto issuers “in the form 
of higher fees.”).
213. See, e.g., DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *11 (“Intermediaries like the Dream-
Funded Portal, however, have no duty to conduct due diligence . . . .”).
214. See Bullard, supra note 207 (manuscript at 33–34).
215. See Crowdfunding Rule 301, 17 C.F.R. § 227.301 (2017).
216. C. Steven Bradford, Online Arbitration as a Remedy for Crowdfunding Fraud, 45 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2018) (“[The reasonable basis standard] is loaded with ambiguity and 
liability risk, but it may impose an affirmative due diligence obligation on the crowdfunding inter-
mediary.” (emphasis in original)).
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decision implied that Fernandez needed a system of review in place.217 A sys-
tem of review smacks of due diligence.  Further, the Hearing Panel also created 
a line drawing problem for funding portals to review their issuer’s Form C.  
While there is no “duty to probe [errors and gaps] in an issuer’s statements,” an 
“accumulation” of those errors and gaps would lead to a funding portal having a 
reasonable basis to deny access to the issuer.218 From this, a duty to assess an 
issuer’s Form C can be implied.219 The inherent ambiguity in what constitutes a 
“reasonable basis” will likely put crowdfunding portals on notice that they may 
have to do more than what they are doing now.220 It is likely that funding por-
tals will overcompensate than undercompensate, because noncompliance means 
they will be subjected to FINRA’s enforcement and have to hire the expertise of 
attorneys—adding costs.
On top of an ambiguous due diligence requirement, the decision attached a 
violation that will add further costs for intermediaries: 200(a) of the Funding 
Portal Rules.221 Rule 200(a) is an ethical obligation to “observe high standards 
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade” and is identical 
to the ethical standard for broker-dealers in FINRA Rule 2010.222 In Dream-
Funded, the rule was attached to everything from Fernandez’s failure to com-
pletely respond to a Rule 8210 request, his failure to provide investors with in-
vestment confirmations, to the misleading real-estate tombstones on the portal 
website he posted.  Everything that DreamFunded did appears to be considered 
against the standards of “commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade.” When words are used to describe every possible situation, they lose their 
meaning.  And when the words attach liability to nearly every kind of violation 
without a clear pattern, the words create ambiguity.  Ambiguity increases uncer-
tainty, and thus costs.223 These costs for intermediaries will have to be passed 
onto their only type of customer: issuers.
217. See Bullard, supra note 207 (manuscript at 34) (“[The Hearing Panel] made it clear that a 
portal has an obligation to ‘review’ these [financial materials of the issuer] and strongly implied that 
such a review was necessary to be able to form a ‘reasonable basis’ under Rule 301.”).
218. Id. (citing DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289).
219. Id. (“At a minimum, [the Hearing Panel] believed that the portal must ‘look at’ an issu-
er’s Form C and deny access if it uncover facially inadequate compliance.”) (citing DreamFunded,
2019 WL 3231289 at *93 n.596 (“Arguably, because Fernandez did not even look at the company’s
Form C, Respondent’s had no basis for believing Company A was in compliance.”)).
220. Id. at 35 (“It is very likely that every crowdfunding intermediary has permitted offerings 
that, under the Panel’s standard, would require denying access to one or more issuers. [The Dream-
Funded decision] may cause intermediaries to mend their ways.”).
221. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289, at *82 (first cause of action), *84 (second cause of 
action), *91 (third cause of action), *94 (fifth cause of action), *98 (sixth cause of action), *99 (sev-
enth and eighth causes of action), *100 (ninth cause of action), *101 (tenth cause of action).
222. See FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(a) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/200.
223. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 217, at 1177.
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Clarity is the solution to all of this cost-adding confusion.  Funding portals 
need to have an idea of what they are responsible for in order to stay on the 
right side of FINRA’s enforcement arm.  FINRA sent a mixed message to fund-
ing portals: that they do not have a due diligence requirement while at the same 
time expecting something that looks a lot like a due diligence requirement.  At 
the same time, they created a line drawing problem for reviewing issuers’ Form 
Cs for “gaps and errors.” How many “gaps and errors” are too many? A funding 
portal wishing to comply with its rules and regulations will have an incentive to 
do more, rather than less, in order to comply.  This will lead to otherwise lean-
operating funding portals to waste resources doing more than what they may 
have to do to remain in compliance.  Additionally, the ambiguous and meaning-
less standard for what constitutes “high standards of commercial honor and just 
and equitable principles of trade” needs to be better defined.
A licensing requirement would dispel confusion, reducing these costs for in-
termediaries and, by extension, issuers.  By providing a vetting measure for 
funding portals at the outset, their obligations as intermediaries will become 
clearer.  Without it, funding portals will either (a) not follow the rules leading to 
more enforcement actions (as discussed in Part II.A) or (b) be stymied by the 
ambiguity, overspending to comply.  A licensing requirement would reduce the 
ambiguity in the DreamFunded decision, reducing costs for intermediary non-
compliance in the form of fewer enforcement actions and for intermediary com-
pliance in the form of better-defined standards.  Reducing costs for intermediar-
ies will benefit issuers and, by extension, the equity crowdfunding market as a 
whole.
In addition, a licensing requirement would lower costs to the entire system 
by increasing the reputation of those funding portals not already in compliance.  
As it stands, most crowdfunding offerings are conducted through the three larg-
est funding portals.224 Most issuers, it seems, prefer to operate through these 
three funding portals as opposed to the other forty-five.225 This suggests that 
there could be a reputational disparity among intermediaries.  Some issuers may 
prefer to offer their securities through the best intermediaries as opposed to oth-
er, less reputable intermediaries.  Since the start of Regulation Crowdfunding, 
seven funding portals have left the market.226 The SEC suggests that this might 
be due to an inability for “small intermediaries [to] attract sufficient deal flow to 
sustain their business model.”227 If that were the case, these “smaller interme-
diaries” could offer a more competitive price structure to issuers, siphoning off 
issuers from the bigger funding portals and creating a competitive market.  In-
224. REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 27 (“The majority of initiated and com-
pleted offerings were conducted through the three largest funding portals.”).
225. See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-
we-regulate (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (FINRA regulates a total of 48 non-suspended funding por-
tals).
226. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 27 n. 67.
227. Id. at 27.
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stead, we see them priced out, which suggests that issuers place a reputational 
premium on those three largest funding portals.
Funding portals at the bottom will benefit the most from a reputational 
boost created by a licensing requirement, which will help the crowdfunding 
market as a whole.  It is highly likely that the three largest crowdfunding portals 
are already disproportionately in compliance with the laws and regulations they 
are required to follow. 228 By virtue of not being one of the big players in 
crowdfunding, issuers already may look at those less reputable funding portals 
with skepticism.  If you aren’t at the top, then you must be doing something 
wrong.  Additionally, in the wake of the DreamFunded decision and the egre-
gious mistakes by Fernandez and his portal, an issuer may question how much 
latent noncompliance exists among funding portals, further incentivizing a pre-
mium to go with the funding portals that get it right.  A licensing requirement 
would add a credibility boost to those intermediaries that do not share the repu-
tation of the three largest intermediaries.  With this reputational increase, small-
er players would at least be able to attract more issuers away with the promise 
of lower prices.  These lower prices would increase competition in the funding 
portal market, decreasing costs for issuers across the board.
In summary, a licensing requirement will reduce costs for funding portals to 
the benefit of issuers.  First, a licensing requirement will clarify the standards in 
DreamFunded, decreasing costs to funding portals across the board.  Second, a 
licensing requirement will increase the reputation of all funding portals but es-
pecially those that are not at the top.  This will allow less reputable intermediar-
ies to swipe issuers from the top in the form of lower fees, increasing competi-
tion in the equity funding marketplace.  One of the two purposes of the JOBS
Act is capital formation, and a licensing requirement advances that purpose.
Now that I have discussed why a licensing requirement is necessary, I will 
discuss a potential framework to design one.
III. POSSIBILITY FOR AN EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENT
A licensing requirement needs to serve two purposes.  First, it cannot be 
more costly to funding portals than for broker-dealers, as Congress intended.229
Second, it must solve the issues presented by the DreamFunded decision.
A possible licensing requirement for funding portals must cost less than the 
preexisting requirements for broker-dealers to meet the first purpose.  As it 
stands, a compliance officer for a broker dealer must pass either a Series 14 Ex-
am or a combination of three exams: the Securities Industry Essentials (SIE) 
228. If they were not, we would see FINRA enforcement actions and significantly less busi-
ness given to them by issuers. But that isn’t the case.
229. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *85 (“Congress imposed fewer obligations on 
intermediaries handling crowdfunding offerings than on broker-dealers in other kinds of offerings 
out of a desire to create a means of raising capital that is less burdensome and less expensive for 
small enterprises.”).
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exam, the Series 7 Exam, and the Series 24 Exam.230 All of these tests are mul-
tiple-choice format and have a relatively low cost.231 They also vary in length 
but are relatively short.232 The tests cover a wide range of information about 
securities regulation from investment banking to general supervision to Sales-
Practice Rules.233 At a high level, these exams test three basic things broker-
dealers should know: the securities industry as a regulated body, a broker-
dealer’s role in it, and what FINRA and the law expect of them.  Broker-dealers 
are also required to continually educate themselves to keep up with the securi-
ties industry.234
To meet the issues presented by the DreamFunded decision, I propose that 
funding portals be subject to similar, though less burdensome licensing re-
quirements.  Specifically, the licensing requirement should do what the qualifi-
cation exams do for broker-dealers: inform them of the securities industry in 
general, what a funding portal’s role is in it, and what the law and FINRA ex-
pect of them.  Like a broker-dealer, a funding portal should be required to des-
ignate a compliance officer to take and pass the exam before registering.  In the 
DreamFunded case, where Fernandez was the chief compliance officer at the 
time of registration, this would have meant that Fernandez would have taken the 
exam.
The following three elements should be covered on a funding portal exam: 
the securities industry as a regulated body, a funding portal’s place in it, and 
what FINRA and the law expect of funding portals.
A. Funding Portals Should be Aware that the 
Securities Industry is a Regulated Body
A licensing requirement would provide funding portals with a general 
knowledge of the securities industry as a regulated body.  Funding portals do 
not exist in a vacuum—the securities industry is highly complex and regulated.  
FINRA Staff acknowledged that funding portals are “new to regulation and 
230. See FINRA Qualification Exam Frequently Asked Questions, FINRA, 
https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/qualification-exams/faq (last visited Feb. 1, 2020)
(“What are the registration and qualification requirements for a FINRA-registered firm’s chief com-
pliance officer (CCO)?”).
231. The costs of the exams are: SIE ($60), Series 7 ($245), Series 14 ($350), and Series 24 
($120). See FINRA Qualification Exams, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-
ce/qualification-exams (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). 
232. The time for the exams is: SIE (1 hour and 45 minutes), Series 7 (3 hours and 45 
minutes), Series 14 (3 hours), and Series 24 (3 hours and 45 minutes). See FINRA Qualification 
Exams, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/qualification-exams (last visited Feb. 
1, 2020).
233. FINRA, COMPLIANCE OFFICIAL QUALIFICATION EXAMINATION (TEST SERIES 14)
CONTENT OUTLINE (2018), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Series_14_Outline.pdf.
234. Mark P. Cussen, How to Keep Up Your Continuing Education, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionaleducation/07/continuing-education.asp (last up-
dated May 31, 2018).
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oversight.”235 Unlike other regulated entities such as broker-dealers, funding 
portals may not appreciate what it means to be a regulated entity.  This likely 
led to Fernandez’s misunderstanding that he was required to comply with 
FINRA’s Rule 8210 request.  Despite that it is clear that funding portals must 
submit to FINRA’s regulatory arm,236 some funding portals (like DreamFund-
ed) may not understand their place in the regulated industry.
Apart from providing a general background of the securities industry as a 
regulated body, a licensing requirement would help funding portals understand 
the role of regulators such as FINRA.  Fernandez misunderstood the FINRA 
MAP staff member’s role as a regulatory enforcer.237 The basic reason for all 
of this regulation is based out a concern for investor protection.  Having a basic 
understanding of what it means to be a regulated entity and why FINRA and the 
SEC exist would appraise actors like Fernandez of that concern.
Armed with a knowledge of the securities industry as a regulated body and 
the regulators within it, Fernandez would have been better notified of his obli-
gations.  Whether this knowledge would have led to his compliance can never 
be known.  However, it likely would have increased the chance that Fernandez 
would have complied.
To better notify actors such as Fernandez going forward, a licensing exam 
could take the form of questions from a test that FINRA has already designed: 
The Securities Essentials Exam (SIE).  The SIE covers:
[Basic] securities industry information including concepts fundamental to working 
in the industry, such as types of products and their risks; the structure of the securi-
ties industry markets, regulatory agencies and their functions; and prohibited prac-
tices.
238
FINRA need not adopt wholesale the SIE for funding portals but could modify 
it to suit funding portals as a section in a larger modified exam.  Regardless of 
what action FIRNA may decide, this section would allay FINRA’s concerns 
that funding portals are new to regulation as well as increase compliance among 
actors who, like Fernandez, did not appreciate their place in the regulated secu-
rities market.
235. REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 33.
236. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h)(1)(A) (2018).
237. See DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *47 (“[The FINRA staff member] expressed 
regret at the hearing that she had not made it clearer to Fernandez that MAP staff had opened a for 
cause examination. Fernandez may not have appreciated the change in SV’s role.”).
238. See Securities Industry Essentials (SIE) Exam, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/
registration-exams-ce/qualification-exams/securities-industry-essentials-exam (last visited Feb. 1, 
2020) (“Your First Step to a Career in the Securities Industry” (emphasis in original)).
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B. Funding Portals Need to Be Aware of their Gatekeeping Role: 
The Basic Requirements
Funding portals are charged with acting as gatekeepers for issuers, so they 
need to understand their role at the most basic level.  While the SEC notes that 
“funding portals are generally aware of their compliance and recordkeeping ob-
ligations,”239 other independent research suggests otherwise.240 Further, while 
the SEC notes that it is aware of only four FINRA actions involving funding 
portals, this represents almost ten percent of all funding portals in the market.  
Recognizing the latency of fraud, that is a high percentage of known noncom-
pliance.  If the regulatory structure surrounding equity crowdfunding expects 
gatekeepers such as Fernandez to serve their role, funding portals need to be 
aware of their most basic requirements.
The DreamFunded decision may not be the only case of funding portal non-
compliance, but it serves as an example of a severe breakdown of the most basic 
requirements.  Fernandez did not keep records, did not conduct background 
checks on the issuers on his site, nor did he provide notice or confirmation to 
the investors who had invested on his site.  DreamFunded operated without an 
understanding of the most basic requirements for the entire year and a half they 
were registered as a funding portal.  If Fernandez had this basic understanding, 
he likely would have understood that he needed to keep records for his business 
instead of throwing them away.  The chances that he would have conducted 
more thorough background checks of the issuers on his site rather than just in-
terviewing issuers and looking at their LinkedIn accounts would have also in-
creased.
The basic requirements for funding portals are clear, and they are easily as-
sessed. Because there are no current qualification exams specific to funding 
portals, FINRA would need to create these new sections.
To assess these basic requirements, FINRA could create multiple-choice 
questions that test a funding portal’s compliance officer on the partal’s basic 
obligations—using DreamFunded as a model.  If a licensing exam contained 
these questions, the chances that intermediaries would understand their basic 
requirements would increase, and cases like DreamFunded, which represent a 
“systemic compliance breakdown,”241 would be a thing of the past.  Without 
understanding their most basic requirements, it will be incredibly challenging 
for funding portals (if not impossible) to understand some of the more ambigu-
ous requirements.
239. See REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 33.
240. See Bullard, supra note 207, at 27 (“[Issuer’s] overall 56 percent rate of compliance un-
der a very liberal standard shows that neither [issuers] nor intermediaries are confirming that even 
the simplest, most objective filing requirements have been satisfied.”).
241. DreamFunded, 2019 WL 3231289 at *110.
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C. Funding Portals Need to Understand their Gatekeeping Role: 
The Ambiguous Requirements
In addition to the most basic requirements, a funding portal is subject to 
more ambiguous standards.  Funding portals must have a “reasonable basis”242
that the issuers on their sites are in compliance, and funding portals must ob-
serve “high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade.”243 It is unclear what these standards mean for funding portals and, as 
discussed,244 ambiguity adds cost.
The DreamFunded decision established ambiguous standards for funding 
portals.  As discussed, Fernandez failed to meet the most basic requirements, 
but this section would have the effect of providing clarity to those funding por-
tals already doing the basics but trying to comply with ambiguous standards.  
Without clarity for these standards, funding portals will overcompensate by do-
ing more than necessary to comply.
A licensing requirement would reduce ambiguity by requiring FINRA to 
better define its standards.  FINRA would have to develop guidelines identify-
ing what they believe funding portals are required to do to have a “reasonable 
basis” and what high degrees of “commercial honor” mean.  Having only four 
cases of noncompliance as guidance, funding portal intermediaries cannot be 
expected to know what they are required to do to meet these ambiguous stand-
ards.  Clarity could be gained by posing hypotheticals to funding portals regard-
ing what would be needed for a “reasonable basis.” These questions could take 
the form of various situations FINRA previously encountered.  Implementing 
these questions would have two beneficial effects.  First, it would force FINRA, 
a priori, to grapple with and apply its own standards.  Second, it would give 
funding portals advanced notice of the kinds of situations they are likely to en-
counter and what they are expected to do in those situations.
To reduce ambiguity, FINRA could base questions of their standards around 
the situations they have handled in the three years since Reg CF took effect.  
The cost to FINRA to make these questions would likely be insubstantial given 
their expertise in creating exams and the countless hours of advice they have 
already given to intermediaries seeking to comply with their requirements.
CONCLUSION
Equity crowdfunding, envisioned by the JOBS Act Title III, has two pur-
poses: investor protection and capital formation.  Regulation Crowdfunding 
placed intermediaries at the center of these purposes, making them the arbiter to 
serve investor protection and capital formation.  In order to meet their gatekeep-
242. Regulation Crowdfunding Rule 302, 17 C.F.R. § 227.302 (2018).
243. FINRA, FUNDING PORTAL RULE 200(a) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/funding-portal-rules/300.
244. See supra Part II.B.
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ing functions, intermediary funding portals are expected to understand and 
comply with “around 1,000 pages of regulations”245 Yet the regulations provide 
no licensing requirement to gatekeep the gatekeepers.
The recent DreamFunded decision presents a threat to both of those purpos-
es.  This was the first litigated case where a funding portal substantially failed to 
meet its gatekeeper requirements.  The decision presents two issues for each of 
the JOBS Act’s twin purposes of investor protection and capital formation.  
Each issue points to the need for a licensing requirement.  First, funding portals 
can register and operate without understanding that they are regulated entities 
and what they are expected to do.  How can investors be protected if a gate-
keeper charged with investor protection is unaware of its role? Second, because 
of the language in the decision in response to Fernandez’s violations, even gen-
erally compliant funding portals are left facing ambiguity with regard to their 
responsibilities under the JOBS Act.  This ambiguity creates costs that will be 
passed onto issuers, threatening the second purpose: capital formation.  A li-
censing requirement for funding portals would solve both of these issues.  
Without gatekeeping the gatekeepers, equity crowdfunding is just a dream.
245. See WEFUNDER, https://help.wefunder.com/#/getting-started-for-investors/304624-what-
kind-of-companies-are-on-wefunder (“Is Wefunder regulated?”) (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
